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1 Introduction
The effects of corruption on economic activity are generally thought to be
negative: corruption may lead to an allocation of resources away from their
most productive uses and may favor inefficient firms (Murphy et al 1993;
Rose-Ackerman 1999, de la Croix and Delavallade 2009).1 This conventional
wisdom is backed by a large empirical literature that shows a negative rela-
tionship between corruption and growth (e.g. Mauro, 1995), FDI (e.g. Wei
2000), poverty (e.g. Gupta et al 2002) and other economic variables. (This
literature is surveyed in Bardham 1997, and in Dreher and Herzfeld 2005).
Lately, however, this general consensus has been challenged. First, there
is the so-called East-Asian paradox: countries like China and Indonesia
have witnessed steady economic growth despite their high level of corrup-
tion (Rock and Bonnet 2004; Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho 2006; Vial
and Hanoteau 2009; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2009). Secondly, the ev-
idence on the negative effects of corruption is called into question by some
recent empirical work; for example, Egger and Winner (2005) find a clear
positive relationship between corruption and FDI; Halkos and Tzeremes
(2010) identify conditions under which corruption can be beneficial for eco-
nomic efficiency; Dreher and Gassbender (2007) find that corruption seems
to reduce the negative impact of regulations on firms entry, thus inducing
a positive effect on welfare and Houston (2007) detects a positive effect of
corruption on GDP per capita.
In an effort to reconcile this conflicting evidence, a recent strand of em-
pirical literature has pointed out that the institutional setting of countries is
important to assess the effects of corruption. These papers test the idea that
the association of corruption with poor economic performance may hold on
average, but corruption could still have expansionary economic effects on a
subset of nations. In particular, it could be beneficial in countries where
governance (political and economic) is defective because it may help over-
come the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions. In other words,
the effects of corruption could be regime specific.
The approaches in testing this conjecture have been varied, because the
notion of good institutional governance is not univocally tied to a single
variable. For example, Aidt et al (2008) measure good governance as the
1 An alternative view of efficient corruption has also a long tradition in economics. See
the survey by Aidt (2003) and the references therein.
1
ability to keep politicians accountable by removing them from office in case
of misbehavior. On the basis of their estimations, the relationship between
corruption and growth is regime specific: in countries with low quality insti-
tutions, corruption has no effect on growth, whereas in countries with high
quality institutions it has a clear negative effect.
Li and Wu (2010) introduce the level of trust in the society as their
relevant institutional variable. The choice of this variable is suggested by a
comparison of two countries (China and the Philippines) with similar indexes
of corruption but different rates of growth; Li and Wu test the hypothesis
that lack of trust makes corruption more predatory. A regression on 65
countries, including trust among the explanatory variables, shows that for
low level of trust corruption has a strong negative impact on growth but
this negative effect is mitigated as the level of trust increases.
Me´ndez and Sepu`lveda (2006) and Heckelman and Powell (2010) look at
the role of freedom. In particular, Me´ndez and Sepu`lveda look at political
freedom and, quite surprisingly, find that corruption can be beneficial to
growth only in free countries. To the contrary, Heckelman and Powell, using
an index of economic freedom, find that corruption is growth enhancing
where economic freedom is most limited. This effect, however, disappears
as government size and the extent of regulation decrease.
Other works use indexes of the institutional setting based on more than
one variable. For example, Me´on and Weill (2010) adopt an index which
includes, among others, quantitative measures of the quality of the bureau-
cracy, the independence of the civil servants from political pressure and
the incidence of regulations hindering market performance. Using firm-level
data on productivity, they find that corruption is less detrimental to effi-
ciency in countries with weak institutional frameworks. Similarly, de Vaal
and Ebben (2011) show that the effects of corruption on economic growth
are ambiguous once we account for institutional features of the country such
as political stability, property rights, and the political system. Finally, Me´on
and Sekkat (2005) find that corruption is most harmful for both growth and
investment where governance is weak; this counterintuitive finding is likely
to be explained by the fact that, in their model, corruption is positively
correlated to the quality of institutions.
A major hurdle of this literature is, obviously, the need to choose rea-
sonable variables to capture a multifaceted notion such as the quality of in-
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stitutional governance; and some counterintuitive findings can probably be
downsized by improving such measures. Still, the evidence is clear enough
to suggest that studying corruption while ignoring its interdependence with
how institutions works may lead to wrong inferences.
Despite these indications, only very few among the theoretical papers an-
alyzing the channels by which corruption impacts on economic performance
take into account the role of institutions. Notable exceptions are Ehrlich
and Lui (1999), Aidt et al. (2008), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009)
and de Vaal and Ebben (2011) which all share a dynamic macroeconomic
perspective. Our analysis, instead, tries to uncover one of the (many) mech-
anisms by which the effects of corruption change with the average quality
of a nation governance using a contract theory model.
The scope of corruption is wide. In this paper we focus on its role in the
process of privatization: the East European countries, Latin America and,
more recently, China taught us that privatizing public or state enterprises
offers great opportunities to engage in bribery (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum
1997; Chong and Lopez de Silanes 2004; Lu et al. 2008). However, the
welfare implications are less univocal. Some argue that bribes can reproduce
the efficiency consequences of a competitive bidding procedure: the most
efficient producer has the largest surplus, therefore he can afford the largest
bribe (Beck and Maher 1986; Buia and Molinari 2008); but most authors
think that corruption is the source of large inefficiencies in privatization (for
example, Tanzi 1998; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Bjorvatn and Soreide 2005).
Our analysis makes clear that both positions have some merit: corrup-
tion in privatization could be beneficial or detrimental to welfare depending
on the type of governance. Our model views the type of governance and
the existence of corruption as two different notions. Governance refers to
the general institutional environment of a country. On the other hand, cor-
ruption is defined, as in most of the economic literature, as the misuse of
public office for private gains by bureaucrats or politicians. Although bad
governance is likely to be more conducive to corruption, the opportunity
to distinguish the two levels is suggested by both anecdotal evidence and
empirical studies that show that corruption is ubiquitous and that it may
exist at all levels of government, regardless of the type of underlying eco-
nomic and political institutions. (See, for example, Glaeser and Saks 2006;
Lu et al. 2008; and the references therein). Therefore, in our model the
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relationship between the type of governance and the existence of corruption
is left open and the analysis is general enough to allow for a bribe-taking de-
centralized bureaucracy to co-exist with good governance and, on the other
hand, to have honest decision makers even in countries characterized by bad
governance.2
We consider the choice to privatize the provision of a public good in a
hierarchical model with three layers: a Central Government, a decentralized
agency and a (private or public) manager. This hierarchy is characterized by
informational asymmetries. The first is between the managers and the two
levels of Government: managers have private information on their ability to
promote efficiency and reduce costs. The second is within the Government:
only the decentralized agency knows the social cost, in terms of quality, of
the managers’ effort in reducing costs.
Because managers are heterogenous in their capacity to pursue efficiency,
setting a privatization price produces a selection on the ability of the man-
agers and, thus, it has an impact on welfare. We investigate the selection
properties of two alternatives governance regimes: in the good one, due to
the superior institutional framework of the country, the Central Government
can delegate to the decentralized agency the decision whether to privatize
and the choice of the privatization price. In the bad one this is not possible.
Since the decentralized department has the same information as the Cen-
tral Government on the managers’ efficiency but has superior information
on the social cost of the cost reductions, bad governance implies that less
information can be used in the privatization decision.
In this setting we show that corruption is always detrimental to welfare
when governance is good, but it could be beneficial otherwise. This occurs
because under bad governance a honest but uninformed decision maker, in
trying to take into account the social cost of the cost reducing activity (a
variable he cannot observe) could make a worse selection than a corrupted
decision maker who does not care about social welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical paper that shows
a regime specific effect of corruption at the microeconomic level. The paper
most closely related to the present one is Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (1997).
They consider a principal-agent model between a regulator and a monopolist
2 For an analysis of the relationship between governance and corruption see Dreher et
al. (2007), and Pellegrini and Gerlach (2008).
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and they find conditions under which the welfare effects of corruption could
be positive due to the tradeoff between bribery and efficiency. However,
institutional features are not an issue in their paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
a model of the tradeoff between public and private provision without cor-
ruption and with symmetric information. Section 3 introduces asymmetric
information and a definition of governance regimes. In Section 4 we first
make a general analysis of the sorting effects of privatization and then we
apply it to the evaluation of social welfare with and without corruption
under both types of governance regimes. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Public vs. private provision
In this section we introduce a simple benchmark model of the trade-offs
between public and private provision of goods such as hospital, school or
prison services. The model is a special version of Hart et al. (1997) to
which we refer for detailed proofs and motivation.3
The Government owns a facility (for example a school) that is necessary
to provide a good. The difference between public and private provision
hinges on the residual control rights of this facility under the hypothesis
that contracts are incomplete.
2.1 Private provision
Private provision requires the facility to be privatized. The Government and
a risk neutral private manager can write a long-term contract specifying two
prices, one for the facility and the other for the public good, respectively
denoted by PF and P0. This basic version of the good brings social benefit
B0 at cost C0, the latter to be borne by the private manager. Suppose that
the price of the basic version exactly covers the cost, i.e. P0 = C0, and PF
is small enough that the private manager is willing to buy the facility.
After the contract is signed, the manager chooses effort e; this effort low-
ers production costs by σ
√
e, where σ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the manager’s
cost reduction ability, but decreases welfare by δe, δ ∈ [0, 1], due to lower
3 In particular, we consider the case b(e) = δe, c(e) = σ
√
e, β = 0, λ = 1. See also
Buia and Molinari (2008).
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quality. Therefore, e modifies the basic version of the good in the direction
of lower cost but also lower quality. Exerting effort costs the manager e.
Social welfare as a function of the manager’s ability σ and his effort e is
W = B0 − C0 + σ
√
e− δe− e.
Effort, costs and benefits are not verifiable, so they cannot be specified
ex-ante in the long-term contract. Since privatization gives the manager
residual controls, the manager can implement any cost reduction he wishes
without any need to obtain Government’s approval. It follows that equi-
librium effort under private provision, denoted by eP , maximizes σ
√
e − e.
Then
eP =
σ2
4
(1)
and equilibrium welfare under private provision as a function of σ2 is
WP (σ
2) = B0 − C0 + σ
2
4
(1− δ).
2.2 Public provision
Consider now public provision. We assume that the description of the good
is part of a contract between the Government and a risk neutral public em-
ployee and we interpret P0 as the wage the latter receives for providing (the
basic version of) the good where, again, P0 = C0. Due to non verifiability,
e cannot be specified by this contract.
When provision is done in-house, the public employee cannot implement
cost reductions without Government approval because he does not have
residual control rights on the facility; also, the cost reducing effort is em-
bodied in the public employee’s human capital, i.e. the Government cannot
achieve cost reductions without the employee’s participation. Therefore,
cost reductions obtain as the result of renegotiating the initial contract be-
tween the Government and the employee, where gains are split according to
the Nash bargaining solution.4
Since in the absence of an agreement only the basic good is produced,
the employee’s payoff after renegotiation is given by 12(σ
√
e − δe) − e. It
4 We assume that gains are divided equally, but any asymmetric division where the
public employee receives a share α of the gains will lead to the same qualitatively results
as long as 0 < α < 1.
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follows that equilibrium effort under public provision, denoted by eG, is
eG =
σ2
4(2 + δ)2
(2)
and equilibrium social welfare when the good is provided in-house is
WG(σ
2) = B0 − C0 + σ
2
4
δ + 3
(2 + δ)2
.
2.3 Evaluation of ownership structure
To evaluate the efficiency of the two forms of provision we compare the two
equilibrium efforts eP of Equation (1) and eG of Equation (2) with the first
best effort e∗ that maximizes social welfare B0 − C0 + σ
√
e− δe− e. Since
e∗ =
σ2
4(δ + 1)2
,
we get that neither form of provision is first-best efficient as eG < e
∗ < eP .
In particular, e∗ < eP because private provision gives too strong incentives
to introduce cost reducing innovations. A private manager does not care
about the negative externality that his effort has on social welfare; thus, his
cost reducing effort is greater than the socially optimal one. On the other
hand, eG < e
∗, i.e. the cost reducing effort under public provision is smaller
than the first best effort, because a public manager gains only half of the
benefits associated to his effort but he bears the whole cost; therefore, he
has too little incentives to introduce cost reducing innovations.
Which form of provision is second-best efficient depends on the value of
the parameters σ and δ, i.e. on the relative efficiency in cost reduction of
the private manager with respect to the public employee and on the social
costs of the cost reducing effort.
In particular, when the two managers have the same σ, the equation
WP (σ) = WG(σ) determines a threshold value δ¯ =
√
2 − 1 ' 0.4142 such
that private provision is better than public for δ < δ¯ and, conversely, public
provision is preferable otherwise. In other words, when the two managers
have the same cost reducing efficiency, private provision is preferable if the
social cost of effort, which is disregarded by a private manager, is not too
large.
When, instead, the private and the public manager have different ef-
ficiencies in cost reductions, denoted respectively by σP and σG, private
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provision is better than public if
σ2P >
(δ + 3)
(1− δ)(2 + δ)2σ
2
G. (3)
Since the expression on the right is increasing in δ, as δ gets larger the
private manager needs higher and higher efficiency, compared to the pub-
lic employee, in order to compensate the negative externality of the cost
reduction.
3 Governance regimes and corruption
In this section we introduce some more structure on the Government con-
figuration and we distinguish between an upper level, denominated Central
Government, and a lower one, represented by a public bureaucrat. We think
of this lower level as a decentralized governmental agency or department with
a more detailed knowledge of the specificities of the facility to be privatized.
In particular, only the public bureaucrat knows the exact impact that the
cost reducing effort has on welfare. We model this informational advantage
over Central Government by assuming that the latter does not know δ and
that this parameter is observable only at the decentralized level.
This hierarchical structure is related to our notion of governance. A
country institutional framework is determined by many things, for example
the quality of the legal and economic systems, the existence of efficient ad-
ministrative institutions in which decision makers are accountable for their
choices, the transparency of the decision making processes and so on. These
elements, taken together, hinge on the range of market and administrative
instruments that the Government is able to use; for example, sound admin-
istrative procedures in the public sector may increase the ability to keep
decision makers accountable and, thus, can make delegation safer and more
efficient. Accordingly, we capture the grey-area scope of institutional frame-
work by defining governance in terms of the Central Government’s ability
to delegate economic decisions to the lower (and more informed) level. In
particular, bad governance is defined as the impossibility to devolve upon
the public bureaucrat the decision whether to privatize and at what price
PF . On the other hand, with good governance the decision can be han-
dled at the lower level. Therefore, given our informational assumptions, bad
governance implies that PF cannot depend on δ.
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The asymmetry of information between the Central Government and
the decentralized agency is not the only one in the model. The other is
between the Government (both at the central and decentralized level) and
the (private or public) manager. We assume that only the managers know
the actual value of their own cost reducing efficiency, while σP and σG are
two independent random variables whose squared values σ2P and σ
2
G are both
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. It is important to stress that both levels of
government share the same information on the private and public managers’
efficiency; therefore, any result that welfare is higher when decisions are
taken at the decentralized level is not driven by the assumption that an
enhanced knowledge on the managers’ cost reducing efficiency allows a more
effective selection of managers.
In this setting, corruption corresponds to the request to the private man-
ager to pay a bribe B, in addition to the official price PF , as a condition to
get the facility. We assume that the request for a bribe is take-it-or-leave-it:
if the manager refuses to pay, the good is provided by a public manager; if,
instead, the bribe is paid, the facility is sold at price PF and provision is
contracted out. Only a dishonest decision maker, who cares uniquely about
the bribe he can pocket, will ask for a bribe. Therefore, corruption can occur
both at the centralized or decentralized level and this is independent of the
type of governance but only depends on the morality of the decision maker.
4 Privatization and its welfare effects
Let T be the total amount of money that the private manager has to pay
to get the public facility. This transfer includes the price of the facility and,
possibly, a bribe B, i.e. T = PF +B.
If T is smaller than the profit that the private manager can extract by
providing the good, i.e. if:
σ
√
e− e ≥ T,
the private manager accepts to pay it and privatization occurs. Since the
optimal effort for the private manager is eP =
σ2
4 , the above condition is
equivalent to σ2 ≥ 4T . If, instead, T is too large, the good is provided by
a public employee. Therefore social welfare, as a function of the private
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manager’s efficiency, is given by:{
WP (σ) if σ
2 ≥ 4T
WG(σG) if σ
2 < 4T
In particular, if T ≤ 14 , the good is produced in-house for low values
of the private manager’s efficiency and outsourced otherwise. Therefore,
expected social welfare as a function of T , denoted by W (T ), is equal to:
W (T ) =
∫ 4T
0
∫ 1
0
WG(σ
2
G)dσ
2
GdσP +
∫ 1
4T
WP (σP )dσP =
= B0 − C0 + 1
8
(1− δ)− 2T 2(1− δ) + δ + 3
2(2 + δ)2
T.
If instead T > 14 , privatization never occurs and provision of the good is
public. In this case expected social welfare is:
W (T ) =
∫ 1
0
WG(σ
2
G)dσ
2
G = B0 − C0 +
1
8
δ + 3
(2 + δ)2
.
Notice that the Government, by setting a transfer T, can indirectly make
a (positive) selection on the type of private manager even if he cannot ob-
serve the value of σP : since less efficient private managers are less willing to
pay in order to get the facility, any strictly positive transfer will exclude less
efficient managers from the outsourcing contract. This positive selection has
a beneficial effect on welfare.
In what follows we find the equilibrium values of the price of the facility
PF and the bribe B with and without corruption under the two governance
regimes. The resulting four alternative situations will be labelled by a pair
of small letter subscripts where g and b refer to good and bad governance,
respectively, and h and c to honest and corrupt decision maker.
Good governance with a honest bureaucrat
This is the case in which the decision to privatize is delegated to a honest
decentralized bureaucrat; therefore Bgh = 0 and the price of the facility P ghF ,
which can depend on δ, is set in order to maximize expected social welfare
W (T ). Then
P ghF =
δ + 3
8(1− δ)(2 + δ)2 .
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Notice that the equilibrium price P ghF is increasing in δ: the price paid by
the private manager accounts for the social damages he produces as a result
of cost cutting. In other words, the selection made by a honest bureaucrat
under good governance is made both on the manager’s capacity to reduce
cost (and to generate personal profits) and on the consequences that the
reduction in costs has on the quality of the good.
Given this price, privatization occurs only when
σ2P ≥
δ + 3
2(1− δ)(2 + δ)2 ,
i.e. it is less likely to occur for larger values of δ and it never occurs when
δ is greater than a threshold value δ = 0.7523.
As Equation (3) reveals, this is the first best privatization decision since
the expected value of the public employee’s efficiency σG is equal to 1/2.
Therefore, a honest bureaucrat under good governance achieves the highest
social welfare conditional on the Government’s lack of information on the
cost reducing efficiencies (σP , σG).
Good governance with corruption
If the decision to privatize is delegated to a decentralized bureaucrat who is
dishonest, the transfer requested to the private manager is T = PF +B and
privatization occurs only when σ2P is greater than 4T .
Taking into account this decision by the private manager, a corrupt
politician who maximizes his expected revenue∫ 1
4(B+PF )
B dσ2
sets P gcF = 0 and B
gc = 18 .
Notice that, even if the bureaucrat knows the social cost of having a
lower quality good δ, he ignores his information and asks for a fixed transfer
T = 18 .
In this case, for σ2P <
1
2 the private manager refuses to pay the bribe and
provision is public; when instead σ2P ≥ 12 , the bribe is paid and the service
is contracted out. Therefore expected social welfare is
W (
1
8
) =
∫ 1
2
0
∫ 1
0
WG(σ
2
G)dσ
2
G dσ
2
P +
∫ 1
1
2
WP (σ
2
P )dσ
2
P .
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Thus, a dishonest bureaucrat, asking for a bribe, enacts a positive selec-
tion on the cost reducing efficiency of the private manager: only the 50%
more efficient private managers pay the bribe. However, unlike the selection
obtained by a honest bureaucrat, the bribe screens out private managers
who get low benefits from implementing cost reductions, regardless of the
social cost of privatizing (as measured by δ). This is why corruption is never
beneficial under good governance, as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under good governance, for any value of δ expected social
welfare is higher without corruption.
Proof: It is enough to show that W (T gh) ≥ W (18) for any value of δ. We
consider two cases:
1. for δ ≥ δ, P gh ≥ 14 and
W (T gh) = B0 − C0 + 1
8
δ + 3
(2 + δ)2
> W (
1
8
);
2. for δ < δ, P gh < 14 and W (T ) is strictly increasing for T < T
gh and
decreasing otherwise. Therefore W (T ) reaches its overall maximum in
T = T gh.
2
Bad governance with corruption
This is the case in which PF cannot depend on δ because of bad gover-
nance and the decision maker is dishonest. Bad governance in this case is
inconsequential because, as we have seen in the previous case, a dishonest
decision maker is not going to use his information on δ. Therefore, under
corruption the equilibrium values of the price of the facility and the bribe
do not depend on the governance regime; thus, P bcF = 0 and B
bc = 18 , as in
the case of good governance.
Bad governance with a honest Central Government
Under bad governance the bureaucrat is not allowed to set the privatizing
price and this is chosen by the Central Government without knowing δ. So
12
far we have assumed that Central Government has an informational dis-
advantage with respect to the decentralized department but we have not
been specific about what the Government knows. Any assumption on the
Government uncertainty about δ, represented by a probability distribution,
will lead to some government’s decision on the price of the facility. Here,
in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities, we take this decision as ex-
ogenously given and we compare expected social welfare, with and without
corruption, for any possible value of P bhF . Obviously B
bh = 0, since there is
no corruption.
Proposition 2 Under bad governance, for any value of δ expected social
welfare could be lower without corruption.
Proof: It is enough to show that, for any δ, there are values P bhF such that
W (P bh) < W (18). The function W (T ) is a concave parabola for T ≤ 14 and
a constant horizontal line for T ≥ 14 ; it has a maximum in T = P ghF if δ ≤ δ
and a continuum of maxima for T ≥ 14 otherwise. Also, P ghF is increasing in
δ and is equal to 18 when δ = δ. We consider two cases:
(i) if δ ≥ δ then P ghF ≥ 18 and W (T ) is strictly increasing on the interval
[0, 18 ]. Therefore any P
bh
F <
1
8 leads to an expected social welfare lower
than the one obtained with corruption.
Notice that for δ < δ expected welfare is lower than the one with
corruption also for any P bhF > 2P
gh
F − 18 (the parabola is symmetric
around its maximum).
(ii) if δ < δ then P ghF ≤ 18 and W (T ) is strictly decreasing on the interval
[18 ,
1
4 ] and constant for T ≥ 14 . Therefore any P bhF > 18 leads to an
expected social welfare lower than the one obtained with corruption.
Expected social welfare without corruption is also lower that the one
obtained by a self-interested decision maker for any P bhF < 2P
gh
F − 18 .
2
The intuition of this result is the following: the first best decision on the
price of the facility would require to set a different price for any value δ of
the social cost due to reduced quality. If the Government does not know
δ, by using the wrong price, it can erroneously select among the private
managers. The selection is detrimental to welfare both when the first best
13
price is larger than the bribe but the Government chooses, instead, a very
low price for the facility (or, for δ < δ, a price way too large) and when
the first best price is smaller than the bribe and the Government chooses
instead a price larger than the bribe (or a price very close to zero.)
Notice, also, that is difficult for an uniformed Government to avoid such
mistakes because any price PF larger than
3
32 (where P
gh
F =
3
32 is the lowest
price that an informed honest Government would ever choose and it corre-
sponds to δ = 0) could be reasonable for some value of δ: sometimes the
Government can decrease welfare by setting the price too high, but the same
effect may also follow with a low privatization price.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we model the trade-off, in terms of cost and quality, of public
or private supply of a public good and we introduce the possibility that the
authority entrusted of the privatization gives his assent to the contracting
out conditional on the payment of a bribe. In this setting, we compare
social welfare obtained with and without corruption under two alternative
governance regimes and we show that corruption has a negative impact in
countries with high quality institutions, while it can be beneficial in weaker
institutional frameworks. This occurs because a bribe could make a selection
of the most efficient producers (who are also those more capable to pay it)
which is better than the one made by a honest Government who lacks the
institutional instruments to set the right privatization price.
Obviously, the intent of the paper is not to hint that institutional weak
countries should let their corruption grow but, instead, to illustrate one of
the mechanisms through which corruption could counteract other institu-
tional shortcomings and, thus, help to explain some of the puzzles of the
recent empirical literature we presented in the introduction.
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